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As the utilization of sensor networks continue to increase, the importance of security
becomes more profound. Many industries depend on sensor networks for critical tasks,
and a malicious entity can potentially cause catastrophic damage. We propose a new key
exchange trust evaluation for peer-to-peer sensor networks, where part of the network
has unconditionally secure key exchange. For a given sensor, the higher the portion
of channels with unconditionally secure key exchange the higher the trust value. We
give a brief introduction to unconditionally secured key exchange concepts and mention
current trust measures in sensor networks. We demonstrate the new key exchange trust
measure on a hypothetical sensor network using both wired and wireless communication
channels.
1. Introduction
1.1. Sensor networks
Sensor networks consist of sensors that measure and provide information in remote
or spatially distributed areas [1]. With the advancement of miniaturization and
wireless technologies, the ubiquity of sensor networks is becoming more prevalent.
The benefits of having smaller dies in semiconductors include; physically smaller
devices, increase ratio of computing power per energy, better battery life, etc. A
few examples that utilize sensor networks include military, health care, environment
monitoring, agriculture, etc.
Sensors are often required to be autonomous, decentralized, and in remote ar-
eas. Such requirements place limitations on sensors and sensor networks, including
low power, limited memory and data storage, physical size, limited communication
bandwidth, cost, privacy, and security [2–4]. There are proposed solutions for some
of these limitations such as energy harvesting, low-power processors, smaller mem-
ory footprint, etc. However, security is a pressing issue since sensors face unique
challenges. Without proper security the entire sensor network can be compromised
and sabotaged.
1
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1.2. Security concerns
Limited computing power in sensors restrict them from utilizing large complex en-
cryption algorithms, also with limited memory and data storage the secure key
cannot be too large. Another security issue facing sensors is that the installation of
optical fiber or wire connections is often not economical. Thus they are often acces-
sible only by wireless communication, which is restricted to work with conditionally
secure key exchange, and make them vulnerable to packet capture, sniffing, and in-
jection [5–12]. In an attempt to mitigate some of these security issues, there have
been several proposals to secure sensor networks, which include defenses against
specific attacks and more efficient protocols [5–12].
Sensor networks require data confidentiality, data integrity, data freshness, avail-
ability, self-organization, time synchronization, authentication, secure broadcasting
and multicasting, and sensor privacy. Attacks on sensor networks include Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks, Sybil attacks, traffic analysis attacks, information flooding
attacks, and node replication attacks [5–12]. Defensive measures against some of
these attacks are key establishment, key encryption, policy-based approaches, in-
trusion detection, and trust management. There have been several approaches for
managing trust in sensor networks, the approach to trust management is based on
the sensor network’s trust mechanism.
1.3. Trust mechanisms
Trust theory has different applications and perspectives, and the concept of trust
has been associated with past behaviors and/or reputation from trusted peers
[13–18]. The notion of trust has been specified by trust definitions, trust character-
istics, and trust values [19]. Trust values have been measured by several different
methodologies such as; Bayesian models [20], Beta distribution systems [21], sub-
jective logic models [22], entropy models [23], fuzzy models [24], and game theory
models [25]. However, these trust value models are not able to distinguish between
conditional and unconditionally secure key exchanges, thus these models need to
be expanded for related applications.
Rather than expanding former models we propose a new key exchange trust
evaluation model, which takes into account the type of key exchange (condi-
tional/unconditional) between two sensors.
1.4. Unconditionally secure key exchange
In software-based key distribution (exchange) protocols the security is only
computationally-conditional, meaning that the eavesdropper has all the commu-
nicated information, and with enough computing resources or time the key can be
fully extracted. The advantage of software-based key distributions is that they are
relatively cheap, easy to install and run, and the key can be exchanged wirelessly.
Unconditionally secure key exchanges are key distribution methods that are
information theoretically secure [26], which means that the information is not in
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the communicated signal, see next paragraph. Thus even with infinite computing
resources the eavesdropper cannot extract the key. However, physical (hardware-
based) key exchanges are the only schemes that can provide unconditionally secure
key exchange. Hardware-based key exchanges are more expensive than software-
based schemes, moreover, wireless key exchange is not possible (except quantum
key distribution with single photons, which require complete darkness.)
So far there are two physical key distribution classes that offer unconditionally
secure key exchange: Quantum Key Distribution(QKD) [27] and the Kirchhoff-Law-
Johnson-Noise(KLJN) scheme [28–50].
In QKD principle, the bits are exchanged via single photon communications and
the physical law which provides unconditional secure key exchange is the quantum
no-cloning theorem [27]. Recently, the fundamental security proofs for QKD have
been debated [51–53]. QKD has also had issues with the non-ideality of practical
building elements, which have lead to the cracking of existing communicators, in-
cluding commercial devices [54–63]. Although, these practical non-ideality problems
can be patched there is no security until the patch is known and applied. Other
concerns with QKD systems are the bulky physical size, it is relatively expensive,
requires large power consumption, its sensitivity to vibrations, and the required
“dark optical fiber”. These characteristics of QKD make it almost impossible to
integrate into a sensor.
In the KLJN scheme, the key bit is exchanged via a wire channel and utilizes
statistical physics [28]. The actual physical laws of providing security are the sec-
ond law of thermodynamics and the properties of Gaussian fluctuations. Relative
to QKD, KLJN can be integrated on a microchip thus it does not have issues with
physical size, energy required, sensitivity to vibrations, etc. KLJN can be imple-
mented into a sensor, but will require a wire to connect every sensor that intends
to acquire a unconditionally secure key exchange.
An illustration of the KLJN setup is in Figure 1.4. In this figure Alice and Bob
have two identical resistor pairs which are RL for the Low resistor and RH for the
High resistor. Each resistor has noise voltages that are enhanced by Johnson noise,
UA,L for Alice’s Low resistor, UA,H for Alice’s High resistor, UB,L for Bob’s Low
resistor, and UB,H for Bob’s High resistor. During the key bit exchange period the
first step is for Alice and Bob to select either RL or RH. The selection of RL and RH
is random and both are equally likely to be selected. Since the selection of RL and
RH is random neither Alice or Bob know which resistor will be selected. Once Alice
and Bob select their respective resistor they measure the voltage and/or current in
the wire. The channel voltage can be modeled by < U2ch(t) >= 4kTeffBKLJN and
the channel current can be modeled by < I2ch(t) >= 4kTeffBKLJN/Rloop with k
being Boltzmann’s constant, Teff measuring the effective temperature, Rloop being
the loop resistance, and BKLJN being the KLJN bandwidth [28]. From < U
2
ch(t) >
or < I2ch(t) > Alice and Bob know which resistor the other end selected, and they
already know which resistor they selected. If the voltage noise level is high then
they both selected high resistors, and if the voltage noise level is low then they
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both selected low resistors, in these outcomes the key bit is discarded and the
next period begins. If an intermediate voltage noise level or current noise level is
measured then a secure key bit is generated, stored, and the next period begins.
This process continues until the desired number of key bits are generated.
Alice Bob
Wire
Data
Channel
Fig. 1. An illustration of the core KLJN system. Alice and Bob each have a communicator which
have noise generators, a “Low” resistor RL (representing the Low bit value), and a “High” resistor
RH (representing the High bit value.) The noise voltages are enhanced by generators emulating
Johnson noise UA,L or UA,H for Alice; and UB,L or UB,H for Bob, at very high temperature. Once
the communicators select a resistor they measure the mean-squared voltage amplitude < U2
ch
(t) >
and/or the current amplitude < I2
ch
(t) >. There is a wire for the key exchange, and there is a
channel for data exchange. Against active attacks and attacks exploiting component non-idealities,
an authenticated public data channel is used to measure and compare bits [30, 47].
The core system in Figure 1.4 is secure against passive (non-invasive) attacks
in the idealized case. However in [30], when Eve is tampering with or changing the
system via an active/invasive intervention such as launching a MITM (man-in-the-
middle) attack [47], the core system is not enough to guarantee security. Similarly,
non-idealities which represent deviations from the original scheme, cause security
leak [30]. For defending the system against these kind of attacks, the instantaneous
voltage and current amplitudes are measured by Alice and Bob, and these quantities
are communicated and compared via a public authenticated data channel. Alice
and Bob have a full and deterministic model of the system, because it is a classical
physical system, therefore incessant measurement of the current and voltage is
allowed. Based on their comparison and preconditions, Alice and Bob decide to keep
or discard the bit having compromised security [47]. The authentication uses only
log2(M) secure bits of the exchanged bits, where M is the number of bits carrying
the current and voltage data in the public channel. In practical applications this
channel can be wireless or wired.
Utilizing KLJN in sensor networks could significantly increase the security level
in sensor networks due to its unconditionally secure key exchange.
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1.5. Motivation for a key exchange trust evaluation
Current trust measures for sensor networks do not utilize unconditionally secure key
exchange. Trust is a belief that may change over time, and is usually based on past
behaviors and/or reputation from a community. Many sensor networks measure
trust based on past behaviors and/or reputation [13–18], but there has not been a
trust measurement that considers the class (conditionally/unconditionally secure)
of the key exchange utilized in their measurement of trust. We propose a new key
exchange trust system that considers the class of the key exchange. The system
utilizes the Geometric series to evaluate the key exchange trust, thus we call it the
G key exchange trust function.
2. Outline of Combined Wired and Wireless Sensor Networks
In this paper we consider peer-to-peer networks only. In such a network it will be
impractical to have direct wired connections from every sensor to every other sensor,
thus we propose to use both wired and wireless communication channels, and form
a wired-wireless hybrid network. The wired sensors can be utilized in areas where
other sensors are in close proximity. Each sensor can then be ranked based on its
key exchange and the number of key exchanges with trusted peers. We therefore
propose the G key exchange trust measure system.
2.1. Network
The wired-wireless network will require sensors to have at least two communication
devices, one for wireless and one or more for wired. A cable will also be required
and can have either one or two wires inside. One wire will be for the key exchange,
and the other optional wire can be utilized as a data communication channel.
Figure 2.1 is an illustration and example of the proposed wired-wireless hybrid
sensor network with ten sensors. In this example sensors A through G utilize both
wired and wireless communication channels, and sensors H through J utilize only
its wireless communication channel. Sensors A and B have a direct connection with
the base station, thus they can have an unconditionally secure key exchange with
the operator. Note how sensor E has two wired connections, this sensor will require
two KLJN communicators. Sensors C, F, and G have only one wired connection
and will require one KLJN communicator. Sensors A, B, and D have three wired
connections, and will require three KLJN communicators. Sensors H through J only
use their wireless communication channel, these sensors are the most vulnerable to
attacks and thus have a low key exchange trust value. Table 1 list every sensor’s
key exchange with all sensors in the network of Figure 2.1, e.g., sensor A has a
KLJN key exchange with sensors B and D, thus we denote this in set notation as
Akljn = {B,D}. Similarly, sensor A has a wireless key exchange with sensors C, E,
F, G, H, I, and J, we denote this in as Awireless = {C,E,F,G,H, I, J}. Note that
Akljn ∩ Awireless = ∅, that is every sensor communicating with sensor A must be
August 16, 2018 5:36 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE elias˙arxiv˙sensors
6 E. Gonzalez & L.B. Kish
classified as having either a wired KLJN key exchange or a wireless key exchange,
but not both. The G key exchange trust system is discussed and analyzed in the
following section.
Legend
Base 
station
Sensor
Wired
Wireless
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
Fig. 2. An illustration of a wired-wireless hybrid sensor network. In this example there are ten
sensors with only select sensors utilizing wired communication channels and all sensors utilizing
wireless communication channels.
Table 1. This table list every sensor’s key exchange with all sensors in the network of Figure 2.1.
Every sensor is classified as having either a wired KLJN key exchange or a wireless key exchange.
Set notation is used to categorize the sets as either KLJN or wireless key exchange.
Sensor Wired KLJN Key Exchange Wireless Key Exchange
A Akljn = {B,D} Awireless = {C,E,F,G,H, I, J}
B Bkljn = {A,E} Bwireless = {C,D,F,G,H, I, J}
C Ckljn = {D} Cwireless = {A,B,E,F,G,H, I, J}
D Dkljn = {A,C,E} Dwireless = {B,F,G,H, I, J}
E Ekljn = {B,D} Ewireless = {A,C,F,G,H, I, J}
F Fkljn = {G} Fwireless = {A,B,C,D,E,H, I, J}
G Gkljn = {F} Gwireless = {A,B,C,D,E,H, I, J}
H Hkljn = ∅ Hwireless = {A,B,C,D,E,F,G, I, J}
I Ikljn = ∅ Iwireless = {A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H, J}
J Jkljn = ∅ Jwireless = {A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H, I}
2.2. Protocol
Before sensors can process a KLJN key exchange the KLJN communicators must
be authenticated. The authentication of two KLJN units must be completed before
they are separated. The KLJN communicator units have a direct wired connection
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with each other, thus there is no need for networking protocols, only the KLJN key
exchange protocol. However, due to the required pre-authentication of the KLJN
communicator units the sensor network’s topography must be planned ahead.
Since the wired KLJN key exchange has been pre-planned, only the wireless key
exchanges need to be processed. Once all sensors in the network has a key exchange
with every other sensor in the network, every sensor in the network will classify
its key exchange with every peer as being either wired or wireless, e.g., Akljn and
Awireless, Bkljn and Bwireless, etc.
3. Geometric Key Exchange Trust System
3.1. The key exchange trust function
The geometric key exchange trust system was designed to have a trust function
Gij with a range of values, Gij ∈ [0, 1], as a measure of the key exchange trust of
sensor i for its communication channel with sensor j. The function Gij is for sensor
i to evaluate the key exchange trust value of sensor j. The input parameters of the
function Gij is ikljn, iwireless, jkljn, and jwireless, these parameters are provided by
the operator or the base station.
3.2. The kill switch
The kill switch γj is a binary parameter of sensor j in the Gij function, which is
set by the operator to γj = 0 when the security of sensor j is compromised, and to
γj = 1 otherwise. The construction of the Gij function (see below) guarantees that
for γj = 0 then Gij = 0.
3.3. Construction of the key exchange trust function
When constructing the Gij function, the following goals should be satisfied:
(i) The contributing terms to the Gij function are determined by:
(a) The number Kij of mutual KLJN key exchanges with sensors i and j, or
Kij = |ikljn ∩ jkljn|;
(b) The number Wj of KLJN key exchanges with sensor j reduced by Kij , or
Wj = |jkljn \ (ikljn ∩ jkljn)|;
(c) The number Zj of only wireless key exchanges with sensor j reduced by
one (due to the wireless key exchange with sensor i), or Zj = |jwireless \ i|.
(ii) Strictly monotonic function. The function Gij is a strictly monotonically in-
creasing function determined by the values Kij ,Wj , Zj . For example, if sensors
j and k have values Kij = Kik, Wj = Wk, and Zj > Zk, then Gij > Gik. As
a consequence, among the non-compromised sensors, the sensor with a single
wireless key exchange should have the lowest contribution.
(iii) Ranks versus class of connections. The contribution of the term containing Zj
will never exceed the contribution of the term containingWj ; and the joint con-
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tribution of the terms containing Wj and Zj will never exceed the contribution
of the term containing Kij . The reason for this requirement is so that KLJN
is the only unconditionally secure key exchange type in the network, thus the
rank of its trust is higher.
Eq. (1) utilizes the sum of three geometric series, and satisfies the above condi-
tions:
Gij(γj) =
{
γj if j ∈ ikljn
γj ·
(∑K
n=1(0.3820)
n +
∑W
n=1(0.1729)
n +
∑Z
n=1(0.1474)
n
)
if j /∈ ikljn
(1)
with K = |ikljn∩ jkljn|, W = |jkljn \ (ikljn∩ jkljn)|, Z = |jwireless \ i|, and γj = {0, 1}.
The case γj = 0 sets Gij = 0. To satisfy conditions Gij ≤ 1 and (i) through (iii)
above we used the following requirements:
(i) The third geometric series will saturate at the geometric coefficient of the sec-
ond series. That is, the third series, in the case of Zj →∞ yields 0.1729.
(ii) The sum of the second and third series, will saturate at the geometric coefficient
of the first series. That is, in the case of Zj →∞ andWj →∞, their component
sum yields 0.3820.
(iii) The sum of the three geometric series will saturate to one. That is, in the case
of Zj →∞, Wj →∞, and Kj →∞, their component sum yields to one.
The details of the derivation are shown in the Appendix.
3.4. Example
Eq. (1) was applied to the network in Figure 2.1. The G key exchange trust values
for all the sensors in Figure 2.1 are in table 2. From table 2 some properties of G
can be observed. The G function is asymmetric, e.g., in table 2 note that GBC(1) 6=
GCB(1). There is also incomplete transitive, e.g., in table 2 note that GAD(1) = 1,
and GDC(1) = 1, but GAC(1) = 0.555 and does not equal one. Note that the G
function given by Eq. (1) is unique for the given conditions. The conditions are to
have a range between zero and one, and a kill switch. Also note that an infinite
number of sensors in lower levels will not undermine a single sensor in a higher
level.
As shown in table 2 the G key exchange trust system will give a higher key
exchange trust evaluation to sensors that are part of a KLJN key exchange, the
more KLJN key exchanges a sensor has the higher the key exchange trust evalua-
tion. Sensors without a KLJN key exchange will have a lower key exchange trust
evaluation, even if there are an infinite number of sensors with only wireless key
exchange. This mechanism will prevent a lower level sensor attempting to under-
mine a higher level sensor since there are ceiling limits to sensors that only share
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Table 2. This table list Gij(γj) key exchange trust values of all the sensors in Figure 2.1. This
table assumes γj = 1 for all js.
j
Sensor A B C D E F G H I J
i
A 1 1 0.555 1 0.701 0.346 0.346 0.173 0.173 0.173
B 1 1 0.346 0.874 1 0.346 0.346 0.173 0.173 0.173
C 0.728 0.376 1 1 0.728 0.346 0.346 0.173 0.173 0.173
D 1 0.701 1 1 1 0.346 0.346 0.173 0.173 0.173
E 0.701 1 0.555 1 1 0.346 0.346 0.173 0.173 0.173
F 0.376 0.376 0.346 0.381 0.376 1 1 0.173 0.173 0.173
G 0.376 0.376 0.346 0.381 0.376 1 1 0.173 0.173 0.173
H 0.376 0.376 0.346 0.381 0.376 0.346 0.346 1 0.173 0.173
I 0.376 0.376 0.346 0.381 0.376 0.346 0.346 0.173 1 0.173
J 0.376 0.376 0.346 0.381 0.376 0.346 0.3458 0.173 0.173 1
a wireless key exchange. A kill switch is in place to allow the G system to remain
subjective with any sensor at any time.
4. Open Questions and Future Work
Since all sensors in the G system must have both wired and wireless communica-
tion channels it will not be practical in some applications. Sensors in the G system
will also need to utilize both symmetric encryption for the KLJN key exchange,
and asymmetric encryption for the wireless key exchange, this will increase energy
requirements, computing requirements, memory, and data storage. Sensors are de-
pendent on the operator or base station to provide or broadcast the KLJN and
wireless key exchange sets of every senor in the network, this dependency will re-
quire the sensors to remain centralized. For sensors to be autonomous future work
must be done where each sensor can broadcast its key exchange sets. Another con-
cern is concealing the cable between the wired sensors. Unconditionally secure key
exchange has not been experimented with in sensor networks, but the realization
of such a network should be of significant interest. The cost of having uncondition-
ally secure key exchange for sensor networks is high, but such is the price for high
security.
For sensors that cannot communicate with other sensors or the base station due
to the distance between them, a multi-hop method is utilized [64]. The G system
does not consider multi-hop cases and would give the sensor a key exchange trust
evaluation of the last sensor it was able to communicate with, this can be improved
in future work. Sensor networks can also utilize different protocols for different
KLJN geometric networks to reduce the cable, time, and KLJN communicators
cost as has been analyzed in [65, 66].
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5. Conclusion
In this study we introduced sensor networks along with its applications, limitations,
and security issues. We then discuss unconditionally secure key exchanges, and
mention how the KLJN key exchange can be included in sensor networks. We
also mention current trust methodologies for sensor networks. Since current trust
methodologies do not consider unconditionally secure key exchange we introduce the
geometric key exchange trust system, a new key exchange trust method for sensor
networks that considers unconditionally secure key exchange in the key exchange
trust measure. An example of sensor networks with sensors utilizing both wired and
wireless communication channels is depicted in Figure 2.1. The G key exchange trust
system is then introduced and applied to the sensor network example in Figure 2.1.
The G key exchange trust system is then analyzed, discussed, and modeled by
Eq. (1). Table 2 shows that a higher key exchange trust evaluation is given to
sensors with KLJN key exchanges, the more KLJN key exchanges a sensor has, the
higher the key exchange trust evaluation. Eq. (1) and table 2 also show that there
are ceiling limits to sensors that only share a wireless key exchange. The G system
depends on the operator or base station to provide the key exchange sets of every
sensor in the network. The kill switch allows the G system to remain subjective of
every sensor in the network. We then discuss open questions about the G system
and possible future improvements.
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Appendix A. Derivation of G
The G key exchange trust system has a range from zero to one, and a kill switch. It
must also consider an infinite number of sensors, and that a sensor in a lower level
cannot undermine a sensor in a higher level. To achieve this we propose to utilized
the geometric series since the geometric series can add an infinite sum (or the
number of sensors), and equal to a finite value (or one.) Since the highest possible
value is one, and with an infinite number of sensors, then the G key exchange trust
system of sensor j relative to sensor i can be written as;
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Gij(γj) = γj ·
∞∑
n=1
an + bn + cn = γj · 1, (A.1)
with γj ∈ {0, 1} being the kill switch of sensor j, and a, b, and c being the component
coefficients. To solve for components a, b, and c, in Eq. (A.1) we note that;
∞∑
n=1
an + bn + cn = 1. (A.2)
Note that the following properties must apply according to the G key exchange
trust system. The first property is;
∞∑
n=1
cn = b, (A.3)
which means that an infinite number of sensors in the third series (
∑
∞
n=1 c
n) cannot
undermine a single sensor in the second series (b =
∑1
n=1 b
n.) The second property
is;
∞∑
n=1
bn + cn = a, (A.4)
which means that an infinite number of sensors in the second series (
∑
∞
n=1 b
n,)
and an infinite number of sensors in the third series (
∑
∞
n=1 c
n) cannot undermine
a single sensor in the first series (a =
∑1
n=1 a
n.) Eq. (A.3) and Eq. (A.4) can be
rewritten to isolate the infinite summation of b as follows,
∞∑
n=1
bn = a− b.
Also, note that if r ∈ R : |r| < 1 then ∑∞n=1 rn = r1−r . Given these properties
Eq. (A.2) can be derived as;
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∞∑
n=1
an + bn + cn = 1,
∞∑
n=1
an +
∞∑
n=1
bn +
∞∑
n=1
cn = 1,
∞∑
n=1
an +
(
a− b)+ (b) = 1,
∞∑
n=1
an + a = 1,
a
1− a + a = 1.
The resulting equation a/(1−a)+a = 1, can be solved for a by using the quadratic
formula giving values a = (3 −√5)/2 and a = (3 +√5)/2. Since |a| < 1, then the
only converging value is a = (3−√5)/2. Thus the component a is,
a =
3−√5
2
≈ 0.3820. (A.5)
A similar method can be used to solve for b and c in Eq. (A.2).
To solve for b note that
∞∑
n=1
bn = a− b,
b
1− b = a− b. (A.6)
Solving for b in Eq. (A.6) gives two solutions. The converging solution is,
b =
a+ 2 +
√
a2 + 4
2
. (A.7)
Given Eq. (A.5) and substituting for a in Eq. (A.7) gives,
b =
7−√5−
√
30− 6√5
4
≈ 0.1729. (A.8)
Thus the component b is given by Eq. (A.8).
The component c can be solved by utilizing Eq. (A.3). Note that,
∞∑
n=1
cn = b,
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c
1− c = b. (A.9)
Given Eq. (A.8) and substituting for b in Eq. (A.9), then solving for c will give,
c =
√
30− 6√5 +√5− 7√
30− 6√5 +√5− 11
≈ 0.1474. (A.10)
Thus the component c is given by Eq. (A.10).
The derivations above were derived to consider any number of sensors, thus
the G key exchange trust function holds for zero sensors to an infinite number of
sensors. In reality there will be a limited number of sensors in a network.
The component a will only consider sensors that are conditionally secured with
mutual KLJN key exchanges, e.g., if sensor i and sensor j have mutual KLJN
key exchanges with third parties, then this can be written in set notation as the
intersection of sensor i’s ikljn set and sensor j’s jkljn set. This can be expressed as
ikljn∩ jkljn. The number of mutual KLJN key exchanges with third parties between
sensors i and j can be expressed as K = |ikljn ∩ jkljn|. Thus, there are K mutual
sensors between sensors i and j.
The component b will only consider sensors that are conditionally secured with-
out mutual KLJN key exchanges, e.g., if sensor i evaluates the number of key
exchanges in sensor j, then only the number of KLJN key exchanges in sensor j
that do not have mutual KLJN key exchanges with sensor i will be noted. This can
be expressed as W = |jkljn \ (ikljn ∩ jkljn)|. The purpose of having component b is
based on the belief that a sensor with a KLJN key exchange should have a higher
key exchange trust value than a sensor without a KLJN key exchange.
The component c will only consider sensors that are conditionally secured with
only wireless key exchanges, e.g., if sensor j only has wireless key exchanges with
other sensors then the number of sensors that can verify a wireless key exchange
with sensor j is Z = |jwireless \ i|.
The G key exchange trust system can evaluate the key exchange trust level of
sensor j relative to sensor i, this can be expressed as Gij(γj), with γj being the kill
switch for sensor j. Gij(γj) can be expressed as the following equation;
Gij(γj) =
{
γj if j ∈ ikljn
γj ·
(∑K
n=1(0.3820)
n +
∑W
n=1(0.1729)
n +
∑Z
n=1(0.1474)
n
)
if j /∈ ikljn
with K = |ikljn∩ jkljn|, W = |jkljn \ (ikljn∩ jkljn)|, Z = |jwireless \ i|, and γj = {0, 1}.
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